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Abstract 
 
 
The “crisis exaggerators” are telling us that current economic conditions amount to an 
“unprecedented” global economic recession. This is historically incorrect. What is 
unprecedented is the degree to which economic commentators and political leaders 
are talking up economic downturn. What is their agenda? Could it be an attempt to 
prepare the way for an “unprecedented” degree of government intervention in the 
economy? The “new interventionists” – some of whom, like Kevin Rudd, are now 
calling themselves “social democrats” – have attacked neoliberalism – the prevailing 
philosophy of Western governments over the past three decades – for failing to 
provide the direction and regulation needed to prevent the emergence of global 
financial crisis. But this misses the real point. Neoliberal governments have in fact 
been dangerously interventionist. Owing to the inflation-targeting policies they have 
championed, the dynamic mechanism of modern society has been disrupted, 
economic growth has slowed dramatically, and unemployment has risen – just as I 
warned in The Global Crisis Makers in 2000. The new global crisis makers are these 
new interventionists, who, ironically, not only accept neoliberal policies of inflation 
targeting but also intend to launch massive Keynesian and climate-mitigation 
programmes of intervention that will throw our strategic life-system into a downward 
spiral from which we will recover only with great difficulty and cost. Modern 
governments have lost the age-old art of strategic leadership, which once facilitated 
the effective operation of humanity’s dynamic life-system. 
 
Keywords: global crisis, neoliberalism, social democracy, strategic leadership, 
economic intervention. 
JEL codes: O11, O47, O56, E31, E32, E42, E50, E60. 
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From many public sources we are being told that the current economic conditions 
constitute an “unprecedented” global economic recession. Economic commentators, 
financial experts, market consultants, public officials, and politicians are all predicting 
the direst gloom and doom. And of course the media are revelling in the 
sensationalism of it all. These public sources are the “crisis exaggerators”. What is 
unprecedented about the current global outcome of financial mismanagement and 
excess is the breathlessness with which the crisis exaggerators are trying to beat-up 
the possibility of global economic disaster. Nothing catastrophic has or will happen, 
but the sideshow crystal-ball gazers are continually telling us that disaster lies just 
ahead. What could be their objective? Could it be that these crisis exaggerators are 
using the very fear they are generating to facilitate their hidden agenda of making 
“unprecedented” interventions into the global economy? Is this, one is led to wonder, 
just a rehearsal for the truly massive intervention that will be required for the 
forthcoming major programme of climate mitigation? What will the future hold in a 
world dominated by these new interventionists? 
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the interventionist intentions of these 
crisis exaggerators and to show how this constitutes a derailing of the traditional role 
of strategic leadership. That traditional role involves facilitating the requirements of 
the dynamic strategists through the provision of appropriate infrastructure that is 
beyond the financial resources and self-interest of individuals and corporations, the 
negotiation of political and economic deals with other societies, protection of the 
dynamic strategy at home and abroad, encouragement of the emergence of new 
strategies during recessions and depressions, and provision of basic facilities for 
education, training, and research needed to nourish the modern technological strategy. 
It is an enabling role rather than the controlling, directing, and even coercive role 
advocated by the “new interventionists”. I will also show how these new 
interventionists relate to the neoliberal policy makers – the old global crisis makers 
who helped to create the current global economic problems. 
 
Varying perceptions of leadership 
 
Perceptions of economic leadership are usually thought of as forming a spectrum of 
approaches, with minimal intervention at one end and maximal intervention at the 
other. Unworkable ideas such as anarchy at one extreme and divine rule at the other 
can be dispensed with. At one end of the workable (at least in the short term) 
spectrum are the various conceptions of “neoliberalism” and at the other various 
conceptions of “socialism”. Social democrats like to think of themselves as holding 
the central position.  
 
The neoliberal position is based on the desire of wealthy individuals and big 
business to minimise government interference in their determined pursuit of material 
prosperity. It is a position supported by neoclassical economics, which advocates 
freely operating markets and, hence, small government along the lines proposed by 
Adam Smith, Friedrich von Hayek, and, more recently, James Buchanan, Gordon 
Tulloch, and Mancur Olsen. What is not clearly understood, however, is that recent 
governments advocating a neoliberal philosophy are neither non-interventionist nor 
even practitioners of small government. Indeed, all so-called neoliberal governments 
throughout the developed world are actually dangerously interventionist in practice.   2
This intervention takes the form of inflation targeting that strikes at the core dynamic 
mechanism in human society. 
 
The “socialist” position is based on the desire of less wealthy individuals, 
together with their union organizations and middle-class supporters, to restrain the 
activities of the rich in order to redistribute GDP in their favour. It is a position 
supported by Keynesian and Marxist economics, which favours varying degrees of 
intervention in markets to achieve outcomes such as economic stabilisation and the 
transformation of “capitalism”. The “socialist” position is also supported by the 
relatively new Green movement, which contains many who once would have adopted 
a Marxist stance. Ironically, these socialist groups have also embraced the dangerous 
policy of inflation targeting.  
 
The purpose of this brief characterisation is not to paint a detailed picture of 
the contemporary scene, but rather to suggest that the various perceptions of the role 
of political leadership are based on sectional interests, which have subsequently been 
rationalised by various forms of economics. Because of this sectional/ideological 
approach, modern society has lost sight of the reason for the emergence and 
persistence of government – leadership of the national strategic pursuit. Interestingly 
despite their sectional approach, they all share the flawed policy prescription of 
neoclassical economics involving major intervention in the form of inflation targeting, 
which undermines the dynamic life-system and applies a brake to economic growth.  
 
The global crisis makers 
 
Both national and global society is constantly under threat from ideologies found at 
either end of the leadership spectrum. The reason is that politicians have forgotten the 
essential role of strategic leadership, which is discussed later in the paper. In The 
Global Crisis Makers (Snooks 2000: 82–86) I called this the “fatal forgetfulness”, and 
showed how it is the outcome of the declining material rewards of political office. 
During the course of the twentieth century, groups from either end of the leadership 
spectrum decided that instead of facilitating the strategic pursuit in the interests of all 
strategists – as all successful societies had done in the past – they would adopt and 
pursue sectional interest ideologies. For the first three quarters of the twentieth 
century the “socialist” perspective prevailed throughout much of the world, whereas 
in the last quarter the neoliberal perspective held sway. Both groups have been 
fanatically supported by their associated ideologues. From what has occurred on the 
political global stage over the past year, it would appear that a swing back to the 
“socialist” camp over the next generation is highly probable. What all these styles of 
leadership have in common, is that they are prepared to intervene dangerously in the 
operation of the dynamic life-system. The danger of intervention lies in the nature, 
rather than the extent, of the interference. 
 
Socialist intervention 
 
The first three-quarters of the twentieth century witnessed the great experiment in 
“socialist” intervention. The most striking case was the establishment of a communist 
system in the USSR in 1917. In part this was an outcome of the metaphysical 
economic and political ideas of Marx and Lenin and in part the attempt by Stalin to 
develop an alternative societal system to that of “capitalism”. The Stalin model   3
became an example followed by a number of (what were then called) Third World 
nations, such as China, Vietnam, Eastern Europe, and Cuba. The essential 
characteristic of the Stalin command system was its antistrategic nature. Basically the 
USSR attempted to suppress the dynamic strategists and to redirect the surpluses of 
Russia and its satellites from strategic to antistrategic ends – from materially driven 
individual activity to ideologically driven command activity. In the process the market 
nature of modern society was replaced by centrally determined decision-making.  
 
In other words, the old dynamic life-system of Russia was replaced by an 
artificial system in which all economic, political, and social decisions were made by a 
highly centralised and ideologically driven bureaucracy. This was an immense 
challenge to Russian bureaucratic ingenuity, which could only be met at great cost in 
terms of the loss of individual freedom, suppressed living standards, and the 
starvation of millions of Russians during the 1930s – a tragedy that China repeated in 
the 1950s and 1960s. By suppressing living standards, the USSR was able to achieve 
impressive military power and narrowly defined scientific progress. But in the 
absence of a self-starting and self-sustaining dynamic system, the Soviets were only 
able to achieve this unbalanced and precarious development by closely imitating the 
technological, educational, scientific, and research advances made in the West 
through their free market economy. Without a freely operating life-system to allocate 
resources and distribute income, the USSR ran into severe difficulties when they 
began to approach the West’s level of technological achievement. Where were they to 
go in the future? The USSR had no strategic system to answer this question. In effect, 
the antistrategic command system of the USSR just ground to a halt after three 
generations of superhuman effort on the part of the long-suffering Russian people. At 
the end of the 1980s, therefore, Russians were forced to face the extremely difficult 
task of rebuilding their strategic life-system from scratch. This is an extreme example 
of the havoc and crisis that economic intervention of the “socialist” kind can inflict on 
humanity.  
 
The West was not immune from “socialist” interventionism, albeit of a more 
moderate kind, following the long years of war, depression, and war again in the first 
half of the twentieth century. Many Western countries flirted with interventionist 
policies, which were demanded by the working classes and made respectable by the 
economics of John Maynard Keynes through the publication in 1936 of his famous 
General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. This led to the emergence of 
Labour or Social Democrat governments in Western European nations determined to 
shift the distribution of GDP more in favour of the “working” classes through direct 
government intervention. It is generally agreed that his experiment, while appearing to 
achieve some of its ideological objectives, impacted negatively on economic growth 
and, hence, living standards.  
 
Indeed, I would suggest that the unfolding technological strategy in the West, 
driven by its freely operating strategic life-system, would have achieved the 
redistribution of income sought by the “socialists”, but at a higher standard of living 
than was actually achieved owing to the large economic costs of intervention. The 
great problem with economic intervention is that it damages the mechanism of the 
dynamic life-system and impacts negatively on living standards. While not as 
devastatingly costly as the imposition of the Stalin command system in Russia or the 
chaotic Maoist system in China, the interventionist experiments of the West were,   4
nevertheless, still very costly. The bottom line is that the costs of intervention are 
always high and the benefits negligible. 
 
Neoliberal intervention 
 
There is a considerable difference between the rhetoric and practice of neoliberalism. 
The theory argues for the primacy of freely operating markets and a restricted role 
(limited to the protection of individuals, property rights, and contracts) for 
government. In practice, self-proclaimed neoliberal administrations do intervene in 
the operation of markets. What they do not do is provide strategic leadership of the 
kind practiced for thousands of years prior to the twentieth century. These 
administrations abandoned the role of national strategic leadership in favour of 
sectional leadership and economy manipulation. As we shall see, neoliberal 
governments have become the global crisis makers of our time, by virtue not of the 
extent of their interventions but of its critical nature. 
 
Neoliberal intervention in the last quarter of the twentieth century and early 
years of the twenty-first century has played a major role in distorting market forces 
owing to its negative impact on the underlying dynamic life-system. The outcome 
predicted by my dynamic-strategy theory has come to pass in the form of the global 
slowdown of 2008-09. As mentioned earlier, that intervention has taken the form of 
inflation targeting. In the mid 1990s I showed that there are two forms of inflation – 
strategic or “good” inflation, and nonstrategic or “bad” inflation – and that strategic 
inflation plays a central role in the core strategic demand-response mechanism 
(Snooks 1997; 1998b; 2008c). While it is sensible to control “bad” inflation – the 
product of unwise monetary and fiscal policy, monopoly activity, and external shocks 
such as a global oil price hike – the persistent attempt to eliminate “good” inflation 
merely leads to the disruption of society’s core dynamic mechanism, which in turn 
forces economic growth to slow, stagnate, and even become negative.  
 
This predicted scenario actually happened in 2008-09 following a couple of 
decades of systematic inflation targeting imposed by governments throughout the 
developed world and by the IMF and World Bank throughout the developing world. 
These same governments, however, have failed to learn this obvious lesson. They are 
now blaming the global slowdown on the problems being experienced in the financial 
sector, which they claim are the outcome of neoliberal policies of deregulation. More 
recently, I also suggested (Snooks 2008d) that once economic growth had been 
disrupted, governments would temporarily abandon inflation targeting for excessively 
expansionary monetary and fiscal policies. This over reaction will merely generate 
more “bad” inflation, which in turn will lead to a further round of inflation targeting 
and growth inhibition. Here we have a vicious cycle generated by interventionist 
policy makers, who once thought of themselves as being neoliberals. 
 
In Australia, for example, Kevin Rudd leader of the Labor Party, went to the 
national elections in late 2007 claiming to be an “economic conservative” committed 
to continuing the monetary policies of the Reserve Bank of Australia that had been 
pursued under all governments over the previous couple of decades. Once in power, 
Rudd and his Treasurer, Wayne Swan, claimed to be waging a “war on inflation” in 
the neoliberal manner (Snooks 2008c). But suddenly in early 2009 there was a 
blinding transformation: the “war on inflation” was replaced with a “war on   5
unemployment”, even though Australia was still operating at a near full-employment 
level (4.4%). Personally the Prime Minister had experienced a road-to-Damascus 
conversion. The self-declared “economic conservative” magically became a “social 
democrat” determined to launch a massive Keynesian spending programme. Spending 
not on the infrastructure of the future (namely science and technology) but on the 
consumption of the present. This brings us to the new interventionists. 
 
The new interventionists 
 
The new interventionism is a direct response to the crystal-ball gazing of the crisis 
exaggerators. And it is a response that has been quickly rationalised in some quarters 
as the outcome of the philosophy of social democracy. The new interventionists – or 
born-again social democrats – have little or no understanding of the dynamic life-
system that they are determined to reform. They have no general dynamic theory and, 
therefore, are confused about the relationship between the financial sector 
(particularly the stock market or economic “casino”) and the real economy. Yet 
despite this lack of understanding they believe, in the words of Kevin Rudd (2009: 
29), that they can “save the system of open markets from self destruction” and that 
they are capable of “building a fairer and more resilient order for the long term”. To 
do this they intend to intervene on a large scale in the economy through flawed 
Keynesian fiscal policies. For example the Obama administration has been given 
congressional approval to spend US $787 billion (Aust $1.2 trillion), and the Rudd 
government intends to spend Aust $42 billion on ephemeral consumption. In addition, 
the Obama administration is intervening massively in the US financial and motor 
vehicle industries and the Rudd government is doing the same in the Australian 
financial and construction industries. 
 
The intellectual support invoked by these big spending administrations is the  
theory developed by John Maynard Keynes in the depths of the Great Depression. 
Recently we were told that “social democrats will draw in part on a long-standing 
Keynesian tradition” by “maintaining aggregate demand” (Rudd 2009: 25, 26). And 
this approach has been promoted to the public by the Australian prime minister Kevin 
Rudd with the slogan: “all hands to the pump”! A major problem with this theoretical 
justification of big spending programmes is that Keynesian theory is virtually defunct. 
The demise of Keynesian analysis – a tradition that has been on its knees rather than 
its feet – after the 1960s was a result of its inadequate static nature. In Global Crisis 
Makers (Snooks 2000: 126–30) I posed the question: “Is Keynesianism dead?”, and 
answered it in the affirmative.  But, as we shall see, old theories never die, they are 
just endlessly recycled!   
 
While claiming to provide a general theory, Keynesianism is unable to handle 
real-world societies, because it is not a general dynamic theory. Aggregate demand is 
not a workable concept unless it can be placed in a dynamic theoretical framework. In 
practice, Keynesian expenditures are unable to kick-start an economy suffering from 
strategic exhaustion, which is the real cause of depression. At best they can only 
stimulate a depressed economy for as long as the fiscal tap is left running. Once the 
tap runs dry – once the fiscal expenditures cease – as it must do in a depressed 
economy owing to the failure of tax revenue, the economy will turn down once more. 
This is what happened in the USA in the late 1930s following the failure of the “New 
Deal” (Snooks 2000: 42–3, 128–29; 2008d). Only expenditures on long-term strategic   6
investment will generate sustained recovery. This only occurred in the US with the 
strategic Marshall Plan, which, together with the preceding war, enabled that country 
to develop a new dynamic strategy to replace the old one that had exhausted itself in 
the mid-1920s, thereby leading to the Great Depression of the 1930s (Snooks 1997: 
386–88: 2008). Of course, if the economy today is not suffering from strategic 
exhaustion, current massive expenditures will generate nonstrategic (“bad”) inflation, 
not economic recovery. And they will use up surpluses that could have been invested 
in strategic infrastructure. Economic “experts” have a lot to answer for. 
 
The lack of understanding of the dynamic life-system by the new 
interventionists is reflected in their analysis of the economy, both past and present. In 
particular, they claim a central role in the economy for the financial sector. This can 
be seen in their misreading of economic history as well as of current circumstances. 
For example, the new interventionists claim that the crash on Wall Street in 1929 led 
to the down turn of the real economy and, hence, to the Great Depression. We are 
told: 
  When the stock-market bubble burst in 1929, it took commercial banks 
with it, causing a devastating chain reaction which affected the entire 
economy for a decade. (Rudd 2009: 23) 
As argued above, the Great Depression in the USA was an outcome of the exhaustion 
in the mid-twenties of a dynamic strategy (workshop to the US mega-market) that had 
driven growth since the Civil War, and it was the resulting flow of funds from 
productive to speculative activity that fuelled the boom and crash on Wall Street. 
Recovery was delayed until the USA had developed a new dynamic strategy (as 
workshop to the world), which did not occur in peace-time conditions until after the 
mid-1940s (Snooks 1997: 388–90). Hence, the financial crisis was an outcome of 
strategic exhaustion in the real economy, not the other way around. 
In attempting to explain the current economic difficulties, the new 
interventionists draw a parallel between their flawed interpretation of the Great 
Depression and the situation today. We are told that: 
In the space of just 18 months this [the global financial] crisis has 
become one of the greatest assaults on global economic stability to have 
occurred in three quarters of a century…This is a crisis which has 
become a general economic crisis; which is becoming an employment 
crisis; and which has in many countries produced a social crisis and in 
turn a political crisis. (Rudd 2009: 20) 
The reason, we are told, that financial crises, which generate downturns in the real 
economy, emerge from time to time is the existence of unchecked corporate greed 
permitted by a prevailing neoliberal attitude. The new interventionists point to the 
“staggering” bonuses paid to corporate executives as evidence of “greed of epic 
proportions” and conclude that the “current economic crisis is the culmination of a 30 
year domination of economic policy by a free-market ideology that has been variously 
called neo-liberalism, economic liberalism, economic fundamentalism, Thatcherism, 
or the Washington Consensus” (Rudd 2009: 22). The neoliberal viewpoint, they 
claim, is “little more than personal greed dressed up as economic philosophy” (Rudd 
2009: 25).   7
Further, the new interventionists reject the idea that freely operating markets 
allow the most effective operation of Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” or Hayek’s 
“spontaneous order”, and they approvingly quote Joseph Stiglitz as saying that “the 
reason that the invisible hand often seems invisible is that it is not there” (Rudd 2009: 
27). In other words, the new interventionists reject the idea of a self-starting and self-
sustaining societal system able to operate without central control and direction by 
social democratic governments. This implies belief in a societal system that is 
continually out of control and in need of constant re-direction and regulation by 
governments advised or led by social democrat “experts”. We are told: 
The intellectual challenge for social democrats is not just to repudiate the 
neo-liberal extremism that has landed us in this mess, but to advance the 
case that the social democratic state offers the best guarantee of 
preserving the productive capacity of properly regulated competitive 
markets, while ensuring that government is the regulator, that 
government is the funder or provider of public goods and that 
government offsets the inevitable inequalities of the market with a 
commitment to fairness to all. (Rudd 2009: 21) 
Certainly the new interventionists are confident of their ability to reform and redirect 
the economy. They claim that: 
Social-democratic governments face the continuing challenge of 
harnessing the power of the market to increase innovation, investment 
and productivity growth – while combining this with an effective 
regularity framework which manages risk, corrects market failures, 
funds and provides public goods, and pursues social equity. (Rudd 2009: 
25. My emphasis.) 
Clearly the new interventionists intend to break and ride the economy like a wild 
stallion! In this wild-west manner they intend to “save the system of open markets 
from self-destruction” and “also to rebuild confidence in properly regulated markets”. 
Triumphantly they suggest that “perhaps this new regime will come to be called 
‘social capitalism’ or ‘social democratic capitalism’” (Rudd 2009: 29). Perhaps 
instead it will come to be called the “new interventionism”.  
There are just two things wrong with the new interventionist interpretation and 
agenda. First, if there is no self-starting and self-sustaining system underlying human 
society, how do they explain the viability and progressive nature of human society 
over the thousands of years prior to the emergence of “social democracy”? And 
second, how is it possible for social democrats to direct and regulate sophisticated 
contemporary societies if their leaders and tame “experts” have no idea how the 
underlying dynamic life-system operates. Just ask the leading “social democrats”, or 
any of their “expert” advisors, to explain their general dynamic theory of human 
society. They can’t, because they don’t have one. Instead they lamely fall back on 
static Keynesian theory that was ineffective in the face of the Great Depression (ie the 
New Deal) – the very crisis that led to its emergence. 
The new interventionists also fail to understand the real problem with 
neoliberalism. They claim that the lethal legacy of neoliberalism is its advocacy of 
“the unrestrained free market”, which in the 1980s under Reagan and Thatcher led to   8
policies that were “anti-tax, anti-regulation, and anti-government” (Rudd 2009: 22). It 
was the failure to regulate leading economies in the last quarter of the twentieth 
century that led to the emergence of “extreme capitalism” and “epic corporate greed”, 
which in turn created the financial crisis of 2008-09, that now threatens global 
meltdown.  
This, however, is to miss the real point. The flaw in the policies of 
governments accused of being neoliberal, was not that they emphasised deregulation 
but rather that they were fundamentally interventionist. Since the 1980s, the so-called 
neoliberal governments of the Western world have in fact intervened in their 
economies in the most fundamental and critical way possible. They have, as we have 
seen, persistently attacked and undermined the core dynamic mechanism of the 
dynamic life-system, which I call the strategic demand-response mechanism. And 
they have done this through systematic and unrelenting policies of inflation targeting. 
Even born-again social democrats, such as the Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, 
have been and, as far as one can tell, still are advocates of inflation targeting.  
The telling point is that both my dynamic-strategy theory and and the 
empirical studies I have undertaken (which gave rise to the “growth-inflation curve”) 
show that inflation targeting cripples the core dynamic mechanism thereby causing a 
breakdown in economic growth and a rise in unemployment in the longer term. These 
calculations and predictions were made as long as twelve years ago. We are now 
seeing the slowdown in economic growth and rise in unemployment that was 
predicted by my general dynamic theory in the mid 1990s. The current problems have 
little to do with the ephemeral financial crisis and much to do with fundamental 
intervention by so-called neoliberal governments. The social democrats want to 
maintain this form of intervention and to extend their meddling into other aspects of 
the economy. Yet, even this is merely preparation for the massive government 
intervention that will be required to launch a comprehensive programme of climate 
mitigation to which these administrations have committed themselves. Currently the 
new interventionists appear to be in the process of becoming the new global crisis 
makers. 
One final comment can be made about the programme of the new 
interventionists. Social democrat theorists have made a critical error in assuming that 
ideas drive and shape human society. They claim, as we have seen, that the current 
“crisis” is the outcome of “free market fundamentalism” and that its solution will be 
the outcome of social democrat philosophy, In fact, these ideas, both neoliberal and 
social democrat, are the outcome of prevailing economic conditions rather than their 
cause. When economies are growing rapidly the free-marketeers grow in confidence, 
influence, and status, but when the economy falters their confidence falls, they lose 
prestige, and the socialists re-emerge from their long slumbers. Even the lunatic fringe 
can now be heard singing the praises and relevance of Karl Marx and his totally 
flawed and discredited metaphysical philosophy (Snooks 1998a: 49–59). The reality, 
as demonstrated by the dynamic-strategy theory, is that desires drive and ideas merely 
facilitate (at best) and rationalise (at worst). But underlying all ideologies is the urge 
to intervene, whether the prevailing philosophy is neoliberal or socialist. And 
fundamentally this urge is materialist in nature. 
   9
Strategic leadership – a lost art 
 
Throughout the history of human society a close relationship has existed between the 
dynamic strategists and their leaders. It is a relationship essential to the prosperity of 
nations and civilisations. But it is a relationship that has broken down during the last 
quarter of the twentieth century. By the 1980s, governments of the Western world had 
transformed themselves from strategic leaders into potential crisis makers, owing to 
their adoption of the irrational policy of inflation targeting; and by the end of the first 
decade of the twenty-first century they find themselves on the edge of the abyss of 
new interventionism. The following analysis is based on the application of a general 
dynamic theory – the dynamic-strategy theory – that is developed in a series of books 
(Snooks1996; 1997; 1998a; 1998b; 2000; 2006) and briefly summarised in a recent 
paper on the so-called financial “crisis” (Snooks 2008d). 
Strategic leadership is essential to the survival and prosperity of human 
society. It was the primary reason for the emergence of government at the dawn of 
human civilisation and for its extension and maintenance ever since. The nature of 
strategic leadership will become clearer when we review the way it has worked 
throughout human history. Basically it involves facilitating the objectives of society’s 
dynamic strategists. This is achieved by coordinating the efforts of strategists, directly 
through government support, and indirectly through cultural institutions such as 
religion, ideology, and the arts. In particular – as stated earlier – the state provides 
basic infrastructure that is beyond the financial resources of individuals and 
corporations, it negotiates political and economic deals with other societies, it protects 
the dynamic strategy at home and abroad, it encourages the emergence of new 
strategies during recession/depressions, and it provides basic facilities for the 
education, training, and research required to nourish the modern technological 
strategy. This is a proactive rather than a passive role, and it is provided by 
representatives of the strategists for the benefit of the strategists. To achieve this, 
successful strategic leaders listen carefully to what the strategists think they need to 
achieve their objectives, rather than imposing arbitrary economic agenda. 
It is important to realise that the strategists do not necessarily encompass the 
entire population of a society. They include only those individuals who invest, either 
in physical or human capital terms, in the dominant dynamic strategy. The proportion 
of the population that can be classified among the strategists has varied throughout 
human history, not in a linear but in a circular way. In palaeolithic society, almost all 
adult members were involved in the family-multiplication strategy, with the result that 
the proportion of the population in the strategist category approached one hundred per 
cent. Hence, tribal leaders needed to take into consideration the aspirations of all 
adults. By contrast, in neolithic society, only a small proportion of the population was 
actively involved in the strategic pursuit owing to the economic monopoly of the 
ruling elite. This proportion ranged from less than one per cent in societies based on 
dependent agriculture (lords and slaves/serfs) to about one-quarter in mercantile 
societies. Only in advanced technological societies has the strategists/population ratio 
once more approached that of hunter-gatherer societies. And because all the citizens 
of modern society are strategists, strategic leadership is vitally concerned with issues 
of social welfare, equality, and fairness. The forces underlying these sociopolitical 
changes are examined in the rest of this section.   10
Strategic leadership in history 
 
The style of strategic leadership is determined by the prevailing dynamic strategy and 
by the stage reached in its unfolding process. As shown in The Dynamic Society 
(Snooks 1996), there have been four different types of human society over the past 
two million years: the nomadic society, the conquest society, the commerce society, 
and the technological society. The dynamic strategies that shape these different 
societies are outcomes of the prevailing technological era. The family-multiplication 
strategy of procreation and migration that underlies the nomadic society was the 
dominant dynamic strategy of the palaeolithic technological paradigm (2 million years 
to 11,000 years before present); conquest and commerce were the dominant strategies 
of the neolithic technological paradigm of agricultural societies (11,000 years BP to 
the mid-eighteenth century); and technological change is the dominant dynamic 
strategy of the modern industrial technological paradigm (mid-eighteenth century to 
present). 
 
Palaeolithic society 
 
In the palaeolithic technological era, hunter-gatherers struggled to survive and prosper 
by increasing family size in order to bring more land resources under family control, 
thereby maximising the exploitation of animal and plant species. Sometimes this 
involved dispossessing and destroying less advanced humanoid species, such as 
Neanderthal man in Europe, and sometimes taking up virgin territory, such as 
Australia some 60,000 (or more) years ago and North America at least 15,000 years 
ago. In this way modern man circled the globe. But, in order to achieve their material 
objectives, these hunter-gatherers looked to family and tribal heads to provide 
strategic leadership. 
An important aspect of this leadership was the wisdom that came with 
experience. Accordingly the young men looked to family and tribal elders to provide 
the guidance needed in this technologically primitive world in order to survive and 
prosper. The relationship between leaders and other strategists in the family/tribe was 
close. Tribal leaders did not misunderstand their role as strategic leaders, because it 
led quickly to failure and death not only of the strategists but also of the confused 
leader. 
The success of the relationship between strategists and their leaders in 
palaeolithic society can be seen reflected in the survival of Aboriginal society in 
Australia for more than 60,000 years before it was destroyed by Britain, the 
pioneering technological society. By contrast, after little more than two centuries the 
technological society in Australia stands at the crossroads, as it does throughout the 
Western world, owing to the lost art of strategic leadership. For tens of thousands of 
years Aboriginal society never lost sight of the role of strategic leadership, as modern 
society has done in the past few decades. 
Neolithic society 
 
The neolithic world was populated by a large number of highly competitive societies, 
all struggling to survive and prosper through the pursuit of either the conquest or 
commerce strategies. While conquest was the normal dynamic strategy in this era, a   11
favoured few societies were able to prosper by following the less exacting strategy of 
commerce. The very different requirements of these two strategies generated 
distinctly different societies in terms not only of their economic and political 
structures, but also of their social and cultural characteristics. As I show in The 
Ephemeral Civilisation (Snooks 1997), conquest societies followed a darker, more 
chaotic spirit, whereas commerce societies pursued the beauty of order and reason. To 
illustrate the different leader/strategist relationship in these entirely different societies, 
I will briefly outline the rise and fall of the Roman conquest society (800 BC – 
AD 476) and the medieval Venetian commerce society (810–1797). 
Rome 
 
Considerable misunderstanding exists about the nature of the conquest society. 
Instead of viewing systematic warfare as an integral part of the ancient economy, 
most scholars treat it as an irrational and entirely negative activity. In reality, conquest 
was the dominant sector of the ancient economy, and it fashioned the central 
institutions around which all other institutions revolved. War was the main means by 
which survival and prosperity were achieved in the pre-modern world. It was 
employed systematically to generate economic growth, something modern economists 
believe can only be generated by technological change. Rome is the best documented 
case of this type of society. 
How did the Roman dynamic work? The conquest strategy was driven by a 
small group of enterprising decision makers, or dynamic strategists, who were 
determined to survive in the highly competitive Mediterranean world and, having 
survived, to maximise their material advantage. On their evaluation — determined by 
an intuitive benefit–cost approach — the best way of achieving this in a 
Mediterranean crowded out by aggressive commercial societies (the Greeks, 
Carthaginians, and Etruscans) was through conquest. The resulting conquest strategy, 
which Rome pursued relentlessly for a millennium, consisted of a number of 
substrategies: “tribal defence”, 800 to 509 BC; “break out from the Tiber Valley to the 
coastal regions”, 509 to 340 BC; “conquest of all Italy”, 340 to 264 BC; “taking the 
strategy overseas (Punic Wars)”, 264 to 201 BC; “turning to the east”, 201 to 146 BC; 
“expanding on all fronts”, 146 BC to AD 180; and, finally, “defending an exhausted 
strategy”, AD 180 to 476. The rise and fall of the Roman conquest strategy had taken 
almost 1,300 years to complete. Our own technological strategy has been in progress 
for only a fraction of that time. 
While Rome was originally led by tribal kings elected from among a small 
warrior elite, its main rise and fall took place under the Republic (509 to 43 BC) and 
the Principate (43 BC to AD 476). In the Republic of Rome, the dynamic strategists 
were the senators, a land-owning, warrior aristocracy that grew in number from 300 to 
900 over these five centuries. They were the leading members of the elite families of 
Rome that took the major share of the profits of conquest and translated them into a 
steady stream of income through the acquisition of land (like purchasing gilt-edged 
securities today). This elite was supported and supplemented by the equestrian class 
(equites), who were engaged in trade, business, tax farming, supplying war materials, 
and financing the political campaigns of the senators (e.g. Julius Caesar). Clearly the 
equites had a vested interest in supporting the conquest aims of the senatorial class.   12
Both the state, and the elite that it represented, invested in the conquest 
strategy in the expectation of generating supernormal profits. The Republican state 
invested in military expeditions, military transport and communication networks, and 
in an imperial bureaucracy. It did this to facilitate the objectives of the leading 
families of Rome, because a conquest/imperial infrastructure could not be provided by 
individual families, particularly when Roman armies began operating outside Italy. 
Nevertheless, the warrior elite invested as heavily as their resources would allow in 
military and imperial skills, fame as a warrior, lobbying to attain military command 
and high political office, and even in military campaigns. 
The return on this conquest investment was high, with the Roman state 
extracting plunder and taxation from the conquered provinces, and the strategists 
grabbing booty from military campaigns and high profits from imperial office. Even 
the common people supported the conquest strategy because they too had much to 
gain both as soldiers and citizens: as soldiers they shared in the spoils of war, which in 
some cases transformed their lives (like winning the lottery today); and as citizens 
they lived tax free and enjoyed subsidised consumption of necessities and of 
entertainment (as at the Colosseum from AD 80). 
The Roman Senate was, in effect, a corporation with a form of limited liability 
and institutional longevity, as the risks were shared by the leading families of Rome 
and were underwritten by the larger, business oriented, equestrian class. Not 
surprisingly, therefore, the Republican Senate provided effective strategic leadership. 
As it directly represented the elite military/landowning class, it never lost sight of the 
strategy of Rome or of its role in leading that strategy. 
Why then did control of Rome’s conquest strategy pass from the Senate to an 
autocrat after 30 BC? Essentially because of the changing requirements — the 
changing strategic demand — of the conquest strategy. As the Roman dynamic 
strategy unfolded, the very scale of the conquest expeditions, that increased in 
proportion to the length of the Empire’s frontier (geometrically rather than 
arithmetically), made it necessary to place immense power for prolonged periods in 
the hands of a few great military men such as Pompey the Great and Julius Caesar. 
Pompey was given greater power than former generals of the Republic in order to 
clear pirates from the eastern Mediterranean, and Caesar was given command over a 
large army for a decade in order to conquer Gaul. As these great military commanders 
were faced in Rome by men merely trained and experienced in law, politics, and 
administration — men who did not command the respect of professional armies — 
there was little to stop them when they demanded absolute power over the conquest 
strategy and, hence, over Rome. 
It was the unfolding conquest strategy, therefore, that led to the civil wars of 
the late Republic (the first century BC). Those wars were an acting out of the strategic 
struggle between the Senate and its great generals — a struggle between Sulla and 
Marius, Pompey and Caesar, Brutus/Cassius and Octavius/Anthony, and, finally, 
between Octavius (by then called Octavian and, later, Augustus) and 
Anthony/Cleopatra. If Rome was to continue to expand and grow richer there could 
be but one final outcome of these civil wars — the transformation of the Republic into 
an autocracy by the victorious general. By the beginning of the first century BC the 
conquest strategy had reached a stage beyond which it could continue to unfold only 
if new campaigns could be conducted on a massive and sustained scale, which was   13
beyond the scope of the Republican Senate. Only a highly centralised system could 
mobilise the resources required. This solution finally occurred towards the end of the 
second century AD. 
By 30 BC, control of Rome’s conquest strategy was firmly in the hands of an 
autocrat, the emperor Augustus, who invited the surviving ruling families (which he 
had ruthlessly purged) to participate, in effect, as non-voting shareholders. In this way 
Augustus eliminated the former counterproductive competition between members of 
the aristocracy. As head of the Roman army, the emperor became the supreme 
dynamic strategist and, hence, a god worshipped by all strategists. In the Republic, 
where strategic leadership was shared equally among members of the warrior elite, 
their pantheon of gods was external to Roman society. 
Yet in one essential matter there was continuity. Strategic leaders in Rome, 
both before and after the civil wars, used cultural institutions, such as religion, the 
arts, and the games, to help reinforce the conquest strategy in their society. These 
cultural activities were essential because they involved all the population, even the 
nonstrategists (merchants, businessmen, workers) in Rome’s conquest strategy. And, 
as I show in The Ephemeral Civilisation (Snooks 1997), these cultural institutions 
embodied and carried forward the spirit of conquest. Only when the conquest strategy 
had been exhausted, around AD 180, were the Roman gods of war replaced by the 
Christian god who, it was thought, had helped Constantine gain absolute power. 
Also, until the Roman dynamic strategy had been exhausted, the relationship 
between leader and strategist was both close and mutually profitable. The Romans 
never forgot the essential role of strategic leadership and, therefore, never required the 
services of economic “experts” (Snooks 1993: 98–100). Indeed there were no 
economic treatises in the Roman world to lead strategic leaders astray. Rome declined 
not because its strategists and strategic leaders failed, but because they were 
remarkably successful and ultimately exhausted their dynamic strategy of conquest.  
Venice 
 
Commerce societies existed in the neolithic era just beyond the reach, either in space 
or time, of great conquest empires. There was no scope for coexistence, as commerce 
societies were irresistible to conquest predators. As history shows, Assyria harried 
Phoenicia; Rome crushed Carthage and enslaved Egypt; Macedonia overwhelmed the 
Greeks, finally swept away the Phoenicians, and ruled Egypt; and the Napoleonic 
Empire extinguished the Republic of Venice. Yet, while they flourished, these 
commerce societies, which sought the beauty of order and reason rather than the 
chaos of a darker imagination, made a contribution to the culture of human 
civilisation that was not surpassed until the emergence of the technological strategy of 
the modern era. To illustrate the role of strategic leadership in the commerce society, I 
will focus on the rise and fall of medieval Venice. 
Just as the commerce strategy adopted by the city-states of ancient Greece led 
to a golden age of cultural and political attainment in the classical world, the same 
strategy employed by the north Italian city-states of the medieval and early-modern 
world led to the classical revival known as the Renaissance. This cultural flowering 
was not a coincidence. In both cases it was an outcome of strategic demand generated 
by the economic dynamic of commerce. Venice played an important role in these   14
developments because, for the six centuries following the First Crusade of 1095, it 
was the leading commerce society in Europe. And as its commerce strategy unfolded, 
Venetian sociopolitical institutions flourished under the driving influence of strategic 
demand. 
Venice is the most successful example of the “pure” commerce society. 
Because they had no land resources, the Venetians were engaged in trade right from 
the very beginning — from the late sixth century AD when Roman families on the 
mainland were forced into the lagoons at the head of the Adriatic Sea by the invading 
Lombards. To survive, these peoples had to trade the sea resources of salt and fish for 
grain and other foods from the mainland. But the Venetians were able to turn their 
poverty of resources into a major asset, because they commanded the gateway to trade 
between Europe and the Orient. 
As the inhabitants of the lagoons grew in number and maritime power, they 
were able to transform their primitive trading activities into a commerce strategy that 
generated supernormal profits owing to their monopoly over key trading routes. This 
was achieved in three distinct stages. The first of these occupied the four centuries 
prior to the First Crusade (1095), when Venetian boatmen traded goods through the 
lagoons and along the rivers of northern Italy. As their trade expanded, the Venetians 
carried – in addition to their harvest of the seas – spices, silks, incense, and slaves 
brought to Venice by Greek traders from the Levant. The second stage in Venice’s 
commerce strategy, involved extending its trading control throughout the Adriatic by 
clearing the region of pirates and of rival fleets operating from the mainland of Italy 
and Dalmatia (modern Yugoslavia). This was accomplished during the tenth and 
eleventh centuries, when the Adriatic became the Venetian ‘lake’, giving access to the 
surrounding lands as well as to key trading routes. 
Stage three involved a break out from the Adriatic into the rest of the 
Mediterranean. This was achieved by negotiating trading privileges in the Byzantine 
Empire in 1082, and by exploiting trading opportunities in the Levant made possible 
by the Crusades. The most remarkable of the Crusades was the Fourth in 1203, which 
was skilfully diverted by Venice in order to do what the Turks had failed to do, 
namely to sack the Christian city of Constantinople and dismember the Byzantine 
Empire. In the process, Venice acquired three-eights not only of the imperial city but 
also of the entire empire. In the ancient world one had to be wary of Greeks bearing 
gifts, but in the medieval world it was necessary to defend oneself against Venetians 
on holy business. With this acquisition of trading posts and colonies throughout 
Romania (the old Byzantine Empire), the Republic was able to dominate 
Mediterranean trade between Europe and the Levant. For a further century, Venetian 
commerce flourished. 
But by the mid-fourteenth century Venice’s commerce strategy was 
approaching exhaustion owing to the advance of Islamic forces in the east and of 
Aragon’s and, later, Spain’s forces in the west. Declining commercial opportunities 
led Venice into conflict with its main rival Genoa in the 1350s and again in the 1370s, 
and also to experiments with the new dynamic strategy of conquest in northern Italy 
during the fifteenth century. While Venice defeated Genoa at sea, the conquest 
experiment on land almost ended in disaster in the early sixteenth century when a 
union of all Europe turned against a predatory Venice. This ended her dreams of 
plunder. With commerce exhausted and conquest in ruins, Venice had no strategic   15
future. From 1529, therefore, the Republic (like Rome after AD180) merely attempted 
to defend its past achievements through diplomacy, first with Europe in the west and, 
after 1718, with the Ottoman Empire in the east. But it was only a matter of time 
before the former glorious republic was swept away. The end finally came in 1797 at 
the hands of the last great Mediterranean conqueror, Napoleon Bonaparte. 
At the time of their independence from the Byzantine Empire in AD1000, the 
Venetian commune consisted of about sixty small communities, or parties, that, 
subject to approval and supervision of the doge, elected their own chiefs (capi di 
contrada) from the wealthy local merchant families. A capo was responsible for 
raising taxes, organising naval service, and undertaking local police duties. The focus 
for this network of parishes was the central market place known as the Rialto, where 
the main inter-parish and international commerce was conducted. Later it became the 
centre of east-west trade between the Levant and the North Sea. 
It is significant that the Rialto is connected by a short canal to the Piazza and 
Piazzetta — the central community squares in Venice — adjoining the Ducal Palace 
(residence of the doge) and the church of San Marco (not the cathedral of Venice but 
the splendid private chapel of the strategic leader). In turn the Piazzetta provides 
access to the Bacino di San Marco, where the larger ships moored. The close 
proximity of Venice’s main dock, the Rialto, the Ducal Palace, and the doge’s church 
symbolises the equally close relationship between the commerce strategy and the 
political and cultural institutions of the Republic. Venice had no doubt about the 
central role of strategic leadership. 
Just as local officials were elected by parish assemblies, so the doge, in the 
beginning, was elected for life by acclamation of the General Assembly consisting of 
all the male inhabitants of the lagoons. While the doge in the tenth and eleventh 
centuries derived his authority from the entire community, in reality his election was 
controlled by the leading merchant families. And before the revolution of 1032, when 
the ruling Orseolo dynasty was overthrown by the leading merchant nobles, the doge 
was, in effect, a monarch for life with unlimited powers. In the early centuries 
following independence, therefore, Venice was a dukedom rather than a commune. 
After the revolution, however, the doge’s powers were constrained by a council of 
elected merchant aristocrats. In this way the Venetian nobility, who built their grand 
houses around the Piazza to be near the seat of government — where the direction of 
the commerce strategy was decided — moved a step closer to a merchant oligarchy. 
With the growing wealth and power of the leading noble families following 
the Venetian break out into the Mediterranean in the late eleventh century, this elite 
found it profitable to take control of the commerce strategy then still largely in the 
hands of the doge. For most of the twelfth century the Michiel family had occupied 
the Ducal Palace and had regularly ignored the advice of its merchant councils. The 
outcome was a break down in the essential relationship between its strategists and the 
leadership. The reaction that followed was predictable. 
Following a disastrous primitive expedition against the Byzantine emperor led 
by the doge in 1172, which returned only with a decimating pestilence, the leading 
merchants deposed and assassinated Doge Vitalle II Michiel. In future the doge would 
be elected directly from the ranks of the leading merchants, and he would never again 
be permitted to reject the advice of his peers. By this act, Venice became a merchant   16
oligarchy with a republican form of government that was required by a rapidly 
expanding commerce society. The essential relationship between leader and strategist 
was restored and effective strategic leadership was reintroduced. Without this 
revolution, Venetian society would have stagnated and, eventually, collapsed at a 
relatively early stage. 
The determination of the merchant nobility to retain control of Venice’s 
dynamic strategy is reflected also in its refusal to hand over administration of the 
commerce strategy to a central bureaucracy. Government strategic policy was the 
responsibility of small committees of three to six unpaid nobles elected by the Great 
Council and supervised by the governing council. In this way the strategists of Venice 
avoided the modern problem of bureaucratic “experts” hijacking the dynamic strategy. 
The Venetian Republic was to remain a benefit society solely for mercantile interests. 
While the commerce strategy was unfolding, Venice’s merchant oligarchy 
provided a flexible form of government that admitted wealthy merchants into the 
highest ruling councils. Only once the commerce strategy had been exhausted by the 
mid-fourteenth century did the existing ruling elite attempt to perpetuate their power 
and wealth by blocking new aspirants to the Great Council representing some 200 
families, with just 30 of these exercising effective power. On turning from commerce 
to conquest during the fifteenth century, the city-state was transformed into an 
imperial state with captured territories on the mainland of Italy and Dalmatia. And as 
this new strategy unfolded, the degree of democratisation achieved earlier was 
reversed. In particular, the General Assembly was abolished, the “commune” of 
Venice was dissolved, and the Great Council of some 2500 members ceded its power 
to the 300 strong Senate. Even the Senate was effectively controlled by the governing 
council, or Signoria, that included merely the doge and the nine leading members of 
the Senate steering committee. This concentration of political power and leadership is 
typical of a conquest society. It also needs to be emphasised that political (and other) 
institutions and organizations do not evolve, rather they are driven by strategic 
demand generated by the unfolding dynamic strategy. 
After the failure of the Venetian conquest strategy, the political system was 
deserted by its bold, energetic, ambitious, and imaginative citizens and left in the 
hands of those seekers after empty status. Strategic leadership in Venice withered 
once its dynamic strategies had been exhausted, because a static society has no need 
of direction. The end was only a matter of time, and when it came the once glorious 
republic gave up without a struggle. In the end there was nothing worth fighting over. 
Technological society 
 
The ancients accepted the reality of the eternal recurrence. Accepted that even the 
greatest civilisations would eventually stagnate, collapse and phoenix-like, rise anew. 
The ruins of past civilisations were there for all to see. They did not even consider the 
possibility of breaking out of this endlessly repetitive pattern, because in the neolithic 
era there was no material incentive to do so. The fall of great conquest and commerce 
societies like Rome and Venice was inevitable. This is why we must consider the 
industrial technological society as entirely new. 
Since the mid-eighteenth century, material incentives have favoured the 
pursuit of the technological strategy. This dynamic strategy has enabled modern   17
society to escape from the eternal recurrence of the rise and fall of civilization and, so 
far, to achieve sustained material progress. The dynamic pathway of the modern 
world is linear (but wave-like) rather than circular (and wave-like). Political 
institutions, therefore, no longer re-emerge from the ashes in familiar forms, but 
develop in entirely new ways. 
But this continuous linear development must not be thought of as inevitable. If 
we persist in enforcing the self-destructive policy of inflation targeting and if we 
undertake massive expenditure programmes (for economic stabilisation and climate 
mitigation), modern society will return to the ancient dynamic process of eternal 
recurrence. To show how the West emerged from this ancient dynamic pattern, I will 
focus briefly on the first nation-state to successfully adopt the technological strategy 
(Great Britain), and on the first mega-state that took it to a logical conclusion (the 
United States). There is much truth in the old saying that if we fail to learn from the 
past we will be condemned to re-live it. 
Great Britain 
 
The rise of Western civilisation cannot be attributed to any single state. It was an 
outcome of the response of many societies throughout the world to a highly 
competitive physical and human environment that gradually exhausted the neolithic 
technological paradigm of the pre-modern world. The last phase of this process took 
the form of an intense interaction between the kingdoms of Western Europe and 
between them and their immediate neighbours. 
For some seven centuries England/Great Britain struggled desperately with its 
neighbours for survival in the pressure-cooker circumstances of Western Europe. 
England was so transformed by this struggle that, early in the seventeenth century, it 
suddenly broke out of its immediate environment into all parts of the world to form 
the largest, most global empire the world has ever known. Yet this great empire was 
considerably more ephemeral than the greatest empires of the ancient world, such as 
Egypt and Rome. Within just three centuries the British Empire rose, flourished, 
basked in its own glory for a brief season, and then fell. While the ancients would 
have been impressed by the global scope of the British achievement, they would have 
been astounded, not so much by the rapidity of its fall, but by the unique fact that after 
the dust had settled, Great Britain still existed, with a viable society and a standard of 
living higher than that in the greatest days of empire. And still growing rapidly. For 
the first time in history a great empire had been able to downsize to its homeland 
without collapsing. Britain was able to succeed where Rome, Venice, and all the rest 
had failed. The British succeeded because they were able, fortuitously, to adopt the 
technological strategy. 
Britain’s development pathway between 1000 and 2009 AD took the form of 
three great liner waves, each of which was about 300 years in duration (Snooks 1997: 
Fig. 10.1, p.276). These “great waves”, which surged forward during the periods 1000 
to 1300, 1480 to 1750, and the 1760s to the twenty-first century, were generated by 
three very different dynamic strategies — conquest, commerce, and technological 
change. In turn, each of these dynamic strategies was composed of a series of 
substrategies that generated long waves of about 50 years. With the exhaustion of 
each dynamic strategy, Britain was fortunate enough to be able to replace it, albeit 
after a hiatus during which stagnation or decline was experienced, with an entirely   18
new dynamic strategy. In this way Britain managed to avoid the collapse that had 
occurred in all ancient societies. Yet, as I show in my global-history trilogy 
(Snooks1996; 1997; 1998a), this was due more to fortunate timing than to superior 
strategic skills. 
The institutional vehicle for the conquest society in Western Europe was the 
nation-state, strategically directed by a hereditary monarchy. In this political system, 
England’s dynamic strategists were the king and his great magnates, who struggled 
against each other for control of the conquest strategy and for all the rewards that it 
brought. The most famous of these struggles took place between the Angevin king 
called John (1199–1216) and his barons in the early thirteenth century, and between 
John’s son Henry III (1216–1272) and his barons led by Simon de Montfort. The first 
of these struggles was largely an outcome of John’s incompetent strategic leadership, 
which dramatically reduced, rather than increased, the wealth and income of his 
barons (or strategists). Despite the heavy, regular land taxes imposed by John to pay 
for his wars, the English king not only failed to capture additional territory in Europe, 
but actually lost all that they had previously held. It was this failure of strategic 
leadership that led the long-suffering barons to rebel and force their king to sign the 
Magna Carta in 1215. 
The great charter was a document not about human rights as some might 
suppose, but about the material rights of a tiny fraction of the population. This ruling 
elite, both lay and ecclesiastical, insisted that the function of government was to 
facilitate the objectives of all those investing in the conquest strategy. It was a clear 
warning to any king who lacked the desire or ability to provide strategic leadership 
that he would be removed. Demonstration of this declaration was not long in coming. 
The expensive failure of Henry III’s conquest strategy in Europe provoked a struggle 
with his barons led by Simon de Montfort between 1258 and 1265. Although Henry 
eventually eliminated the rebellious, and briefly successful, de Montfort, he was 
forced to accept the traditional role of strategic leadership — to facilitate the 
objectives of all strategists. 
English kings financed conquest — an expensive and risky undertaking — by 
imposing taxes on the surplus generated by agriculture and, increasingly, on the 
growing profits of commerce. But to tax these growing commercial interests (largely 
in the production and trade of raw wool), English kings found it necessary to gain 
their formal approval by inviting their representatives to attend parliament at 
Westminster. In 1258 this included two “knights” (growers of wool) from each shire, 
and in 1265 a further two burgesses (wool merchants) from each of the main 
boroughs. At this time Parliament met in two chambers, the Commons (knights and 
burgesses) and the Lords (great magnates both lay and ecclesiastical). 
From the mid-thirteenth century, therefore, the English monarch was only able 
to raise the funds required to finance the conquest strategy by taxing and consulting 
the emerging commercial interests. While the new political institution of Parliament 
(a place for “speaking”) was developed initially to serve the failing conquest strategy, 
in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries it became the stage for a desperate 
struggle between the aristocratic supporters of the old conquest strategy on the one 
hand, and the middle-class supporters of the new commerce strategy on the other. 
This struggle was eventually resolved, but only through civil war, in favour of the 
supporters of commerce.   19
The major focus of the commerce society is the city. Owing to the 
extraordinary profits generated by the commerce strategy through its monopoly access 
to resources, commodities, and markets, its metropolis is able to achieve a size 
unimagined by neolithic societies relying solely on agriculture. Population is attracted 
to these centres of commerce by the spectacular growth of real income and wealth to 
be earned in urban trade, finance, and manufacturing. And as the commerce strategy 
unfolds, the metropolis becomes the centre of an overseas empire. 
Within this institutional framework a great struggle took place in England 
from 1500 to 1750 between the supporters of the competing dynamic strategies of 
conquest and commerce. The outcome had critical implications for the nature of the 
political and economic system, not only of England but also of Europe and the world. 
Had the old feudal aristocracy won this struggle, then England, like France and Spain, 
would have turned once more to the conquest strategy, and the Industrial Revolution 
would have been delayed at great cost in terms of human life, prosperity, and liberty. 
As conquest declined and commerce increased during the fifteenth century, the 
wealth of the new mercantile middle class grew in relation to that of the old warrior 
aristocracy. Hence, when the Tudor dynasty first came to power in 1485, it was to the 
new men of commerce, rather than to the old men of conquest, that they turned for 
support. Henry VII, who understood that survival meant supporting the new 
strategists, was the first English monarch to make the transition of leadership from a 
conquest to a commerce strategy. In a highly competitive world, the decision to lead 
the commerce strategy in England meant leading it in Western Europe. Elizabeth I 
embraced this role. Her war against Spain was not a war of conquest but a war in 
defence of the commerce strategy both at sea and on the continent of Europe. It was a 
war in support of the Netherlands — that other pioneering commerce society in 
Western Europe — against a powerful conquest nation. It was a war that had the 
financial support of England’s commercial classes, because the victory of Spain 
would have snuffed out their dynamic strategy. Conquest and commerce societies 
cannot coexist. 
Unlike the Tudors, the Stuart dynasty that followed failed to understand that 
England had been changed forever by the commercial expansion of the sixteenth 
century and that the monarch was expected by the middle classes to act as the leader 
of the commerce strategy. By refusing to call the Commons and by exploiting other 
sources of funds (customs; feudal revenues; fines; and the sale of honours, rights to 
collect taxes, and crown monopolies), the Stuarts were determined to abandon the 
strategic leadership of England. Charles I (1625–1649) refused not only to defend the 
commerce strategy in Europe, but even to provide English merchants with protection 
against their rivals overseas or against pirates in local waters. He refused, in his own 
words, to be ‘a Doge of Venice’, preferring instead to pursue dynastic wars in 
Scotland and Europe. When English merchants complained to the king about pirates 
in the Mediterranean, Charles told them dismissively: “Well, don’t go there”. It was 
this blunt refusal to provide strategic leadership that led to the English civil war 
(1642–1648) between king and commons. 
Even when the Stuart dynasty was restored in 1660 after the death of Oliver 
Cromwell, they failed to appreciate that they were on trial and that their survival 
depended on providing effective leadership for the commerce strategy. Charles II 
(1660–1685) not only refused to act as protector of commerce in Europe, but   20
maintained close contacts with the conquest strategy of France. After a generation of 
frustration in the face of kingly intransigence, Parliament in 1688 called upon William 
of Orange, the effective ruler of the Dutch Republic and defender of the commerce 
strategy on the continent, to force James II (1685–1688) from the throne. 
The change of monarchs in 1688 was called the ‘Glorious Revolution’, not 
because of English enthusiasm for the Dutch king but because at long last the middle 
classes had found a true leader and defender of their commerce strategy. To prove it, 
William III (1689–1702) and Mary II (1689–1694) immediately involved England in 
the War of the League of Augsburg against France from 1689 to 1697, and in the anti-
French Wars of Spanish Succession from 1702 to 1713. And the Commons loved it. 
They readily agreed to the raising of heavy land taxes by which the long and 
expensive wars — much more expensive than the dynastic wars of the Stuarts — were 
financed. The important point is that these wars advanced England’s commerce 
strategy. When the house of Hanover accepted the English crown in 1714, it did so on 
Parliament’s terms. Never again would a British monarch misunderstand what was 
expected of him or her by the dynamic strategists. The Commons had finally created a 
monarchy in their own image. 
The third and latest great wave of economic change in Britain, which began in 
the mid-eighteenth century, is being driven by the novel dynamic strategy of 
technological change. It is this strategy that has enabled Western Europe to break free 
from the eternal recurrence. It is this strategy that has generated the technological 
paradigm shift known popularly as the Industrial Revolution. By introducing the 
technological strategy, Britain was able to generate extraordinary profits from new 
products and new processes within its own borders. Industrial innovation replaced 
monopoly access to external resources and markets as the engine of growth. In this 
way Britain gained a competitive advantage over its neighbours and created a wealthy 
and powerful nation-state that no longer depended heavily on its overseas possessions. 
Empire was continued only in order to defend the technological strategy (through the 
balance of power concept — see The Ephemeral Civilisation [Snooks 1997: 294–
300]), and only until the more economical nuclear deterrent was developed in the 
1940s. After this the British Empire was quickly dismantled, with no adverse impact 
on the living standards of the British Isles. 
As the technological strategy unfolded, a number of important institutional 
changes, driven by strategic demand, have taken place. These changes include the 
transition from a ‘limited’ to a ‘constitutional’ monarchy by which strategic 
leadership passed from king to Commons, and the emergence of universal suffrage, 
which placed control of the dynamic strategy in the hands of the entire British people. 
The struggle to achieve these changes has taken place in Parliament rather than on the 
battlefield, as in the mid-seventeenth century. The reasons for this are that all 
combatants gained from the unfolding technological strategy, and that new and 
effective leaders emerged in response to the demands of the new strategists. 
As the Industrial Revolution took hold, the new strategists — the owners of 
industry who imitated the commercial gentry by purchasing old estates — increased 
their representation in Parliament. And as their numbers increased they struggled 
against the old gentrified commercial interests for control of the dynamic strategy in 
order to defend and increase their hold over the sources of their wealth. The main 
battle between these forces in Parliament raged over the Corn Law issue — whether   21
to impose high import duties on wheat — in the 1840s. The reason this issue did not 
lead to armed conflict is that the new technological strategy not only provided scope 
for the industrialists to earn extraordinary profits, but also enabled the more 
entrepreneurial commercial interests to rebuild their fortunes. With the new and 
cheaper products generated by the technological strategy, British merchants were able 
to make rapid inroads into overseas markets and, hence, to share in the extraordinary 
profits of the Industrial Revolution. Only the unenterprising and entrenched 
commercial gentry, who were able to offer little effective resistance, were finally 
swept away. 
Even the working classes benefited from the technological strategy. While the 
initial stages of the Industrial Revolution were de-skilling, the unfolding technological 
strategy generated a growing demand for increasing numbers of semi-skilled and 
skilled factory workers. And as these workers began investing time and experience in 
learning these new skills (human capital) they became increasingly valuable to the 
industrialists and their real wages began to rise, particularly after 1830. The growing 
economic and political power of the workers is reflected in the emergence of skilled 
unions from the 1830s to the 1860s, of semi-skilled unions in the 1870s, of ‘unskilled’ 
(this is a misnomer — they actually invested in general education and factory skills) 
unions in the 1880s, and in the extension of the franchise to male householders 
between 1867 and 1884, to all males in 1918, and to all females in 1928. 
In other words, despite the theories of Karl Marx and the rhetoric of the left 
wing of politics, the workers and the middle classes were not struggling against each 
other to achieve final victory for different and competing dynamic strategies. Rather 
they were and are co-strategists because both have a vested interest in the success of 
the industrial technological strategy. Both groups have much to lose from its failure. 
Of course there are differences, but these are confined to the distribution of the 
surplus generated by a common strategy. In all other respects the political 
representatives of both groups are called upon to provide the same type of strategic 
leadership. This is why there has never been, and will never be, a proletarian 
revolution in a viable “capitalist” society. This why during the Great War, workers 
fought alongside their “capitalist” countrymen rather than boycott the war in favour of 
international worker solidarity as the radical socialists wanted. The workers’ interests 
were national rather than international because they, like the “capitalists”, were 
concerned to defend their country’s dynamic strategy in which they had a vested 
material interest. There is no such thing as a global dynamic strategy because there are 
no global strategists. Marx and his followers were wrong because they had an 
unrealistic dynamic model of human society. 
Most observers of England’s history over the past millennium have interpreted 
the succession of “feudalism”, “mercantile capitalism”, and “industrial capitalism” as 
a unidirectional and irreversible process. In the same way they regard the emergence 
of parliamentary democracy as an evolutionary process. Both conclusions are 
incorrect. The emergence of any one of these societal systems depends on the type of 
dynamic strategy adopted, which in turn depends on underlying changes in factor 
endowments together with the future capacity of the prevailing technological 
paradigm. The conquest → commerce → technological sequence of Britain was 
historically unique and only occurred, as I show in my global-history trilogy, because 
the exhaustion of the commerce strategy coincided with the exhaustion of the global   22
neolithic paradigm. In earlier societies, such as ancient Greece or medieval Venice, 
the strategic sequence was the more typical conquest → commerce → conquest, 
which led their sociopolitical structures and the process of democratisation to turn 
back on themselves. And the nature of strategic leadership, as we have seen, closely 
followed the demands of the strategists. 
The United States of America 
 
In the Old World the vehicle of technological change was the nation-state, whereas in 
the New World the dynamic strategists discovered that they could compete effectively 
with Western Europe and earn supernormal profits by creating a mega-state. This is 
the key to understanding the economic, political, and social development of the 
United States. Had it been possible for the founding colonies of North America to 
generate supernormal profits by employing the nation-state as a strategic vehicle, the 
mega-state would not have been created. Instead, North America would have 
consisted of a large number of nation-states in imitation of Western Europe. The civil 
war of the early 1860s, I argue, was fought on this issue. 
The mega-state of North America was formed through the adoption, 
unfolding, and replacement of a number of dynamic strategies originating in the 
seventeenth century. These strategies include the participation of the American 
colonies in the British commerce strategy until the 1760s — what I call the 
dependent-commerce strategy — the family-multiplication strategy that drove 
America’s westward expansion for the century before 1890, and the technological 
strategy that emerged after 1870 and developed exponentially to become the dominant 
dynamic strategy from the 1890s. 
The pursuit of these strategies transformed a handful of small settlements on 
the east coast of North America at the beginning of the seventeenth century into a 
mega-state occupying the entire continent between (approximately) the 30th and 45th 
parallels at the end of the nineteenth century. In this way the United States surpassed 
Britain in terms of living standards by the end of the First World War, and went on to 
lead the world in pushing back the global technological frontier in the generation after 
the Second World War. This was only achieved, however, because of the close 
relationship between American leaders and the nation’s dynamic strategists – because 
of the adoption of strategic leadership. 
The driving force behind the United States’ economic growth and 
sociopolitical change was the unfolding strategic sequence of dependent-commerce → 
family-multiplication → technological change. Of these, the first was a spin-off from 
the English commerce strategy examined above, which was responsible for planting 
the initial and most successful colonies on the east coast of North America. Once 
these colonies had been successfully established, in order to serve the commercial 
interests of the mother country, local entrepreneurs participated in the English strategy 
as junior players. While they derived benefits from English investment, markets, and 
security, they were constrained by overall objectives formulated in and administered 
from London. They had no say in English policy-making. Indeed, English strategic 
leadership took little notice of colonial strategists. 
America’s dependent-commerce strategy came to an end in the last quarter of 
the eighteenth century when the colonists successfully rebelled against the mother   23
country. The fundamental reason for this rebellion, which was first propounded in The 
Ephemeral Civilisation (Snooks 1997), was Britain’s refusal to provide American 
strategists with the strategic leadership they demanded. In other words, the revolution 
was an outcome of the clash between two competing dynamic strategies. Although the 
birth and development of the American colonies in the seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries was the direct outcome of the English/British commerce strategy, 
an alternative dynamic strategy, this one American-born, began to emerge in the mid-
eighteenth century. This new dynamic was the American family-multiplication 
strategy, which involved the settlement of new land through the process of new 
family-formation, initially through high fertility rates and, after 1812, through massive 
immigration. It was this dynamic that powered the great westward movement of the 
American frontier and fed the growing industrialisation of the north-east. 
But Britain, which pursued a sea-based rather than a land-based dynamic 
strategy, attempted to block this western expansion through a series of proclamations 
in 1763, 1768, and 1774, with the intention of restricting settlement to the eastern 
seaboard. As I show in The Ephemeral Civilisation (Snooks 1997: 369–72), it was 
this struggle over strategic leadership rather than the irritating taxation imposts of the 
British that led to the American War of Independence (1775–1783). By winning this 
war, at a cost that greatly exceeded the value of British imposts over the lifetime of 
the revolutionaries, the Americans gained control of their own dynamic strategy and 
of the immensely rich rewards that it promised over their, and many future, lifetimes. 
And these rewards were realised, but only because the new American government 
provided effective strategic leadership. They did this by financing the exploration of 
the continent (Lewis and Clark 1803–06); by extending the borders of American 
society by purchasing Louisiana from Napoleon Bonaparte in 1803, by taking Texas 
and the south-west from Mexico in 1845 and 1848, by acquiring Oregon Territory in 
1846, and by purchasing Arizona from Mexico in 1853; by making this land cheaply 
available to the rush of new immigrants; and by heavily subsidising transport and 
communications that integrated this vast land mass into a viable mega-market. 
The American civil war (1861–1865) was, I argue in The Ephemeral 
Civilisation (Snooks 1997: 381–84), also a struggle for control over America’s 
dynamic strategy, this time by two very different groups of American strategists. By 
the mid-nineteenth century the North had, for about two generations, pursued a 
technological strategy linked to the expansion of the domestic mega-market. They 
were more highly urbanised and industrialised, paid higher wages, and wanted to 
impose high tariffs to exclude British manufactured goods. In contrast, the South was 
locked into a dependent-commerce strategy, by which they supplied raw cotton to 
feed British industrialisation; it consisted of a collection of rural societies based on 
slave labour; and it rejected protective tariffs because these only increased the cost of 
importing manufactured goods from Britain and the North. 
Owing to these competing strategies, the North and the South possessed 
fundamentally different attitudes to the future political structure of North America. 
The North was committed to the concept of union, but only because its dynamic 
strategy required the development of a large and highly integrated market. As any 
fragmentation of that market would threaten their supernormal profit making, the 
strategists of the North were determined to preserve the Union at all costs. The North,   24
in other words, was irrevocably committed to the idea of the North American mega-
market. 
The South did not share this commitment. While Southern strategists were 
keen to participate in the westward expansion, because of the supernormal profits that 
could be made by exploiting the new land through farming or breeding slaves — the 
very reason they fought in the War of Independence — the longrun progress of the 
South depended more on its economic relationship with Britain than with the rest of 
America. The South, therefore, was equally determined to pursue its dependent-
commerce strategy, even as a separate country (or countries) if the costs of remaining 
in the Union rose to unacceptable levels. They favoured the concept of the nation-
state as in Europe, rather than the mega-state relentlessly pursued by the North. 
The real source of conflict between the North and the South, therefore, was not 
the ‘moral’ issue of slavery as conventional wisdom tells us, but the fundamentally 
different and conflicting dynamic strategies to which they were totally committed. 
Slavery was merely the most obvious manifestation of this more fundamental 
economic difference. While the North rationalised its materialistic pursuit by raising 
the moral issue of the freedom and dignity of all humans — and there was a small 
minority that believed this passionately — they would not and did not, go to war over 
a moral issue. Similarly the South did not go to war to evangelise their system based 
on slavery. As the historical record clearly shows, the existence of slavery in the 
South was not even challenged by the North in the events that led up to the civil war. 
That came later as the North attempted to attract others, particularly in Europe, to its 
cause. The outbreak of war emerged from the determination of the North to prevent 
the fragmentation of their growing mega-market and was continued, despite the 
enormous cost in lives (600,000 men) and infrastructure, by both sides to protect and 
enhance their incompatible dynamic strategies. The civil war, therefore, was all about 
the future of strategic leadership in America. 
With the victory of the North, the industrialisation of the United States could 
proceed apace. Before 1860, rapid industrial development had occurred, but it was 
restricted by the size of the domestic market and had largely followed the path laid 
down by the European Industrial Revolution. Only after the civil war had been won 
were the northern industrialists able to fully exploit the American mega-market and, 
in the process, to make their own contribution to the modern technological strategy. 
This contribution was the mass-production and mass-distribution of standardised 
manufactured commodities. In this they were assisted by governments that understood 
the importance of strategic leadership. In particular these governments subsidised the 
building of railroads ahead of demand: in 1860 the United States had only 30,000 
miles of railroad, but by 1914 this had increased by a factor of eight to a total of 
250,000 miles. The focus of economic leadership, therefore, was on strategic 
infrastructure. 
American prosperity increased rapidly between 1870 and 1914, resulting in a 
doubling of real living standards, and only came to an end in the mid 1920s when the 
domestic mega-market was finally saturated with locally-manufactured products. As 
argued earlier, it was the exhaustion of this technological substrategy that led to the 
Great Depression, the duration of which was an outcome of the time taken for 
American strategists to reorient their industrialisation program towards the world 
market. This event also demonstrated how governments could panic and lose the plot   25
by listening to economic “experts” and forgetting their role as strategic leaders. 
History is in the act of repeating itself today with the so-called “financial crisis” and 
“economic meltdown”.  
Once the United States had in the 1940s discovered its new substrategy as 
workshop to the world, it was possible to resume its former rapid growth. With this 
strategic re-orientation, the United States overcame its former political isolationism (a 
product of its earlier inward-looking substrategy) and took up the global leadership of 
the technological strategy that had formerly been provided by Britain. It was this 
leadership role that created the “golden age” of the 1950s and 1960s, and that brought 
the United States into cold-war confrontation with the USSR as leader of the 
antistrategic world. But this was only possible because the US government began 
listening to the strategists again and, thereby, rediscovering their strategic-leadership 
role. 
Unfortunately, since the 1980s, US governments, like those throughout the 
Western world, have lost the art of strategic leadership. Increasingly they have looked 
to economic “experts”, rather than to strategists, to tell them how to govern. This has 
led to the adoption of policies like inflation targeting that undermine both the 
strategists and the operation of the dynamic life-system, with the predictable outcome 
of a slow-down in economic growth and a rise in unemployment.  This curious policy 
is driven by metaphysical rather than strategic considerations. The most recent 
response to this strategic crisis, by the newly elected president Barack Obama, has 
been to massively increase the degree of intervention in the financial and industrial 
(motor) sectors and to initiate a huge ($US 787 billion) Keynesian expenditure 
programme (which he hoped would be even larger). What is actually required in this 
strategic crisis is the final abandonment of inflation targeting, a rejection of calls to 
interfere with the dynamic life-system, and the initiation of a long-term programme of 
investment in the strategic infrastructure required to successfully launch the next great 
technological paradigm shift or economic revolution (Snooks 1996: ch 13; 2009). 
Failure to rediscover strategic leadership will lead in the short run to a “rebellion” of 
American strategists and the replacement of antistrategic administrations, and in the 
long run to the USA becoming a loser in the race to lead the next great technological 
revolution. 
 
From this survey of strategic leadership over the past three millennia, it is clear that 
there has always been a close relationship between a society’s leader and its 
strategists. In successful societies, leaders able and willing to serve the interests of 
their dynamic strategists have always emerged in response to strategic demand. But 
whenever a political leader has been unable to provide strategic leadership a crisis has 
developed and he has been swept away. And there have always been alternative 
leaders ready and able to fill the void. Had those alternatives not been available, the 
prevailing dynamic strategy would have collapsed and, in a competitive world, the 
society in question would have been absorbed by more successful societies. Unless 
contemporary society can revive its enthusiasm for strategic leadership, and reject the 
interventionist advice of metaphysical “experts” in both the social and natural 
sciences, this will be our fate also.   26
Conclusion 
The greatest threat to human society is not corporate “greed” or the various 
rationalising philosophies of political parties, it is the unquenchable materialist urge to 
intervene in the working of the dynamic life-system despite not understanding the 
way it operates. As we have seen, all political groups, whatever their rationalising 
philosophies, are determined to pursue the destructive policy of inflation targeting. 
The new interventionists even want to add to this by extending intervention so as to 
control the financial sector as well as various failing industries, and to undertake 
hugely expensive, yet largely ineffective, Keynesian policies. In the process, modern 
governments have lost sight of the traditional government role of providing strategic 
leadership – of facilitating the need of the dynamic strategists who are driving the 
strategic pursuit that has always enabled human society to survive and prosper. 
Contemporary governments have decided to follow the advice of metaphysical 
“experts” rather than respond to the needs of the strategists. 
Finally I want to suggest that this new interventionism is only the beginning of 
global interference on a massively unprecedented scale. It is only a rehearsal for the 
big event – climate mitigation. Without wanting to deny the existence of climate 
change, a lage-scale programme of climate mitigation will constitute the greatest 
interference with the working of the global dynamic life-system in the history of 
humanity. The resulting disruption arising from this future intervention could be 
something from which we will never recover (Snooks 2009). The new global crisis 
makers are on the march and it will take great determination to stop them. A clear 
understanding of what is happening is the first step in that great campaign. 
 
GDS 
16
th February 2009 
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